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Bind shared safety controls to the current owner connection - #57
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armstrongsam25
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October 10, 2026 04:47
armstrongsam25
marked this pull request as draft
October 10, 2026 05:18
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Owner emergency-stop controls carry the server-offered revision and authenticated connection across web, Windows, Android, Apple and Watch. Safety writes cannot enter offline replay. A disconnected, replaced or retired owner connection invalidates the displayed controls; only an explicit correlated status read restores them. Failure and timeout recovery remains reachable during mandatory first-run provider setup.
Supports AstralDeep/AstralDeep#363. The shared manifest includes stop, resume and recheck, with 141 actions and unchanged frame count. No new primitive or runtime dependency. Extracted-source provenance is refreshed in the same commits.
Android's explicit TLS deployment profile validates matching API/WebSocket origins, registered mobile callback identity and AppAuth PKCE. Cookie-custody WebSocket upgrades send exactly one canonical validated Origin. Its dedicated session transport preserves strict no-retry credential writes and the caller's pool; bounded HTTP/2 reads handle completed bodies without waiting for another stream frame. Windows fixes retain GUI ownership of asynchronous image delivery and speech objects and retire layout items before widget transfer.
Validation of final revision
4f9af8657287616d0479bd52ef6e565e1fa87ff2:Local native tests and new Android staging used
ac1dcbf603abccaf62cd2b87ffb3c75a69f69313. The final revision only wraps one Swift XCTest line for strict formatting; every product/runtime, Windows, Android, web, protocol and tooling input is byte-identical. Those executions retain their original source identities, with recorded equivalence to the final revision. Hosted results above execute the final revision directly.The staging record retains failed observer attempts (navigation, browser onboarding and a parsed-element truth-value bug) and the earlier
human_authentication_requiredrefusal. The synthetic Android browser displays a private-hostname identity warning. Its actual certificate fingerprint matched an independent strict TLS handshake against the exact CA installed in that browser's process; hostname, chain and validity checks passed, with no warning bypass.The owner explicitly waives live Mac verification. No CI-failure exception is used: every required hosted check passes on the final head. No production deployment or release publication is included.