Add EC2 capacity provider observability sample

[balancin]

What this adds

A new sample: a Strands agent on an AWS-managed EC2 instance (Instances compute type / capacity provider), behind an AgentCore Gateway, with end-to-end OpenTelemetry. The client's W3C traceparent becomes the parent of the agent's spans, so a single trace spans client → Gateway → runtime → EC2 → Bedrock, and gen_ai.* usage lands in the GenAI Observability screen.

Path: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/01-hosting-agents/10-ec2-capacity-provider-observability/

Why

It sits between two existing samples and fills the gap between them:

• 08-http-ec2-capacity-provider — the capacity provider, but no observability
• 04-observability-with-strands — observability, but serverless

This is the intersection: observability of a capacity provider.

What deploy.py sets up (idempotent)

IAM (3 roles) → private subnet with no public IP and a zero-ingress SG → the 7 VPC endpoints a private subnet needs → the image (built on CodeBuild, no local Docker) → CapacityProvider → runtime → Gateway → Transaction Search. invoke.py exercises the Gateway and the direct path and verifies the trace survived; cleanup.py removes everything in the order the service requires.

Conventions followed

• Same file layout as the neighbouring samples; image built via CodeBuild with the Dockerfile inlined in deploy.py (no versioned Dockerfile, per repo .gitignore).
• Plain public boto3 (≥ 1.43.66) — no vendored SDK.
• Region has no silent default (falls back to the profile); refuses to run rather than launch EC2 somewhere you did not choose.

Validation

Validated end to end on a real account in us-east-2 and us-west-2: cold start 57–76 s, warm 2–3 s, every trace matched, EC2 with no public IP (IMDS public-ipv4 → 404), and the full deploy → invoke → cleanup cycle leaves nothing running.

The README documents the traps hit in practice, each with its fix: the OTLP region needs a single source (ADOT signs SigV4 with the region parsed from the endpoint, so a baked-in region wins — deploy.py sets it per region); every VPC endpoint is load-bearing and a missing xray/bedrock-runtime one fails silently; the Gateway needs protocolType omitted and serverProtocol=HTTP; one deployment per VPC (interface endpoints take one subnet per AZ); and instanceProfileArn is omitted so there is no shared fixed-name IAM role.

[github-actions]

Latest scan for commit: 20137fc | Updated: 2026-08-13 17:58:16 UTC

Security Scan Results

Scan Metadata

• Project: ASH
• Scan executed: 2026-08-13T17:58:00+00:00
• ASH version: 3.0.0

Summary

Scanner Results

The table below shows findings by scanner, with status based on severity thresholds and dependencies:

Column Explanations:

Severity Levels (S/C/H/M/L/I):

• Suppressed (S): Security findings that have been explicitly suppressed/ignored and don't affect the scanner's pass/fail status
• Critical (C): The most severe security vulnerabilities requiring immediate remediation (e.g., SQL injection, remote code execution)
• High (H): Serious security vulnerabilities that should be addressed promptly (e.g., authentication bypasses, privilege escalation)
• Medium (M): Moderate security risks that should be addressed in normal development cycles (e.g., weak encryption, input validation issues)
• Low (L): Minor security concerns with limited impact (e.g., information disclosure, weak recommendations)
• Info (I): Informational findings for awareness with minimal security risk (e.g., code quality suggestions, best practice recommendations)

Other Columns:

• Time: Duration taken by each scanner to complete its analysis
• Action: Total number of actionable findings at or above the configured severity threshold that require attention

Scanner Results:

• PASSED: Scanner found no security issues at or above the configured severity threshold - code is clean for this scanner
• FAILED: Scanner found security vulnerabilities at or above the threshold that require attention and remediation
• MISSING: Scanner could not run because required dependencies/tools are not installed or available
• SKIPPED: Scanner was intentionally disabled or excluded from this scan
• ERROR: Scanner encountered an execution error and could not complete successfully

Severity Thresholds (Thresh Column):

• CRITICAL: Only Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• HIGH: High and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• MEDIUM (MED): Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• LOW: Low, Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• ALL: Any finding of any severity level causes scanner to fail

Threshold Source: Values in parentheses indicate where the threshold is configured:

• (g) = global: Set in the global_settings section of ASH configuration
• (c) = config: Set in the individual scanner configuration section
• (s) = scanner: Default threshold built into the scanner itself

Statistics calculation:

• All statistics are calculated from the final aggregated SARIF report
• Suppressed findings are counted separately and do not contribute to actionable findings
• Scanner status is determined by comparing actionable findings to the threshold

Scanner	S	C	H	M	L	I	Time	Action	Result	Thresh
bandit	0	3	0	0	1	0	656ms	3	FAILED	MED (g)
cdk-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	5.5s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
cfn-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	34ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
checkov	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.6s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
detect-secrets	0	0	0	0	0	0	916ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
grype	0	0	0	0	0	0	59.2s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
npm-audit	0	0	0	0	0	0	197ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
opengrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	SKIPPED	MED (g)
semgrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	MISSING	MED (g)
syft	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0s	0	PASSED	MED (g)

Detailed Findings

Show 3 actionable findings

Finding 1: B310

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B310
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/01-hosting-agents/10-ec2-capacity-provider-observability/agent/agent.py:48-50

Description:
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.

Code Snippet:

try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=2) as r:
            return r.read().decode()

---

Finding 2: B602

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B602
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/01-hosting-agents/10-ec2-capacity-provider-observability/agent/agent.py:138-141

Description:
subprocess call with shell=True identified, security issue.

Code Snippet:

# check=False on purpose: a failing command's stderr is exactly what we want to show
        r = subprocess.run(command, shell=True, capture_output=True,
                           text=True, timeout=15, check=False)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:

---

Finding 3: B310

• Severity: HIGH
• Scanner: bandit
• Rule ID: B310
• Location: 01-features/02-host-your-agent/01-runtime/01-hosting-agents/10-ec2-capacity-provider-observability/invoke.py:130-132

Description:
Audit url open for permitted schemes. Allowing use of file:/ or custom schemes is often unexpected.

Code Snippet:

try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=900) as resp:
            return json.loads(resp.read().decode()), tp, time.time() - t0, None

---

Report generated by Automated Security Helper (ASH) at 2026-08-13T17:57:51+00:00