fix(gateway): prevent cleanup scripts from destroying shared resources

[jyotsnamas]

Summary

Two cleanup scripts have destructive bugs when used with shared gateways:

1. scripts/waf/cleanup.py — deletes entire gateway instead of its own target

• The WAF tutorial's deploy.py accepts an existing GATEWAY_ID and creates a single target on it
• But cleanup.py calls admin.delete_gateway() which deletes all targets and the gateway itself
• This destroys resources belonging to other tutorials running on the same gateway
• Fix: Only delete the specific target using TARGET_ID stored in .env

2. scripts/semantic-search/cleanup.py — race condition on gateway deletion

• Calls admin.delete_gateway() which deletes targets then immediately attempts gateway deletion
• Target deletion is asynchronous — gateway delete fails with ValidationException: Gateway has targets associated
• Fix: Explicitly delete targets, poll list_gateway_targets until empty (up to 2 min), then delete gateway

Test plan

• WAF cleanup: verified it only removes its own target, leaving other targets intact
• Semantic search cleanup: verified targets are fully deleted before gateway deletion proceeds
• Both scripts handle already-deleted resources gracefully (ResourceNotFoundException)

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

[github-actions]

Latest scan for commit: 2516759 | Updated: 2026-08-13 20:19:06 UTC

Security Scan Results

Scan Metadata

• Project: ASH
• Scan executed: 2026-08-13T20:18:52+00:00
• ASH version: 3.0.0

Summary

Scanner Results

The table below shows findings by scanner, with status based on severity thresholds and dependencies:

Column Explanations:

Severity Levels (S/C/H/M/L/I):

• Suppressed (S): Security findings that have been explicitly suppressed/ignored and don't affect the scanner's pass/fail status
• Critical (C): The most severe security vulnerabilities requiring immediate remediation (e.g., SQL injection, remote code execution)
• High (H): Serious security vulnerabilities that should be addressed promptly (e.g., authentication bypasses, privilege escalation)
• Medium (M): Moderate security risks that should be addressed in normal development cycles (e.g., weak encryption, input validation issues)
• Low (L): Minor security concerns with limited impact (e.g., information disclosure, weak recommendations)
• Info (I): Informational findings for awareness with minimal security risk (e.g., code quality suggestions, best practice recommendations)

Other Columns:

• Time: Duration taken by each scanner to complete its analysis
• Action: Total number of actionable findings at or above the configured severity threshold that require attention

Scanner Results:

• PASSED: Scanner found no security issues at or above the configured severity threshold - code is clean for this scanner
• FAILED: Scanner found security vulnerabilities at or above the threshold that require attention and remediation
• MISSING: Scanner could not run because required dependencies/tools are not installed or available
• SKIPPED: Scanner was intentionally disabled or excluded from this scan
• ERROR: Scanner encountered an execution error and could not complete successfully

Severity Thresholds (Thresh Column):

• CRITICAL: Only Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• HIGH: High and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• MEDIUM (MED): Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• LOW: Low, Medium, High, and Critical severity findings cause scanner to fail
• ALL: Any finding of any severity level causes scanner to fail

Threshold Source: Values in parentheses indicate where the threshold is configured:

• (g) = global: Set in the global_settings section of ASH configuration
• (c) = config: Set in the individual scanner configuration section
• (s) = scanner: Default threshold built into the scanner itself

Statistics calculation:

• All statistics are calculated from the final aggregated SARIF report
• Suppressed findings are counted separately and do not contribute to actionable findings
• Scanner status is determined by comparing actionable findings to the threshold

Scanner	S	C	H	M	L	I	Time	Action	Result	Thresh
bandit	0	0	0	0	0	0	398ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
cdk-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.1s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
cfn-nag	0	0	0	0	0	0	6ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
checkov	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.5s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
detect-secrets	0	0	0	0	0	0	931ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
grype	0	0	0	0	0	0	56.0s	0	PASSED	MED (g)
npm-audit	0	0	0	0	0	0	167ms	0	PASSED	MED (g)
opengrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	SKIPPED	MED (g)
semgrep	0	0	0	0	0	0	<1ms	0	MISSING	MED (g)
syft	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.1s	0	PASSED	MED (g)