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Modeling Christensen's Capitalist's Dilemma as cost-benefit arbitration between model-based and model-free RL systems (Diak 2021 + implementation)

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Modeling the Capitalist's Dilemma with Multiple RL Systems

A computational formalization of Clayton Christensen's "Capitalist's Dilemma" as a cost–benefit arbitration between model-based (analytical) and model-free (intuitive) reinforcement-learning systems — with a runnable simulation, a full statistical-analysis pipeline, and a deployable human-behavioral experiment.

📄 Paper: paper/Diak-2021-Modeling-the-Capitalists-Dilemma-with-Multiple-RL-Systems.pdf (Diak, 2021 — HBSDOC 4882, Harvard University)


The idea

Christensen and van Bever's Capitalist's Dilemma (HBR, 2014) makes a qualitative, influential, but slippery claim: when capital is framed as a scarce resource, managers lean on analytical valuation metrics (NPV, IRR, RONA, ROIC) and away from the long-horizon, balance-sheet-heavy bets that actually produce growth.

This project renders that claim as a mechanism. Drawing on the dual-process literature in cognitive neuroscience, it models the two decision modes as two reinforcement-learning systems:

  • Model-based control = System 2 / analytical. Learns the task's transition structure and plans — the RL analogue of NPV-style valuation with an explicit financial model.
  • Model-free control = System 1 / intuitive. Caches state–action values from experience via temporal-difference learning — the RL analogue of experience-driven gut calls.

A hybrid agent mixes them by an arbitration weight w:

Q_hybrid(s, a) = w · Q_MB(s, a) + (1 − w) · Q_MF(s, a)

The paper's central move: a framing effect is not (only) a downstream bias of System 1, but an upstream modulation of the arbitration weight w itself — the parameter that governs which regime the system operates in. Framing capital as scarce is hypothesized to shift w toward model-based control. In dynamical-systems terms, w is the order parameter that tips the agent between two computational regimes.

What's implemented

capitalists_dilemma/
├── environment/          # Two-stage investment task (deterministic-transition MDP)
│   ├── two_stage_task.py     # Kool et al. "novel two-step" task, investment-framed
│   └── reward_schedule.py    # Drifting (Gaussian random walk) reward schedules
├── agents/
│   ├── model_free.py         # SARSA(λ) temporal-difference agent (System 1)
│   ├── model_based.py        # Transition-learning planning agent (System 2)
│   └── hybrid.py             # Weighted MB/MF arbitration (the `w` parameter)
├── simulation/
│   ├── conditions.py         # 2×3 factorial conditions
│   └── run_simulations.py    # Batch simulation engine
├── analysis/
│   ├── stay_probability.py   # Logistic regression — the canonical MB-vs-MF signature
│   ├── model_fitting.py      # Fit the hybrid RL model to behavioral data
│   └── factorial_anova.py    # 2×3 ANOVA on estimated control weights
├── visualization/plots.py
├── web_task/task_spec.md     # Browser (jsPsych) experiment for the human arm
├── results/                  # Figures + summary statistics (see below)
├── tests/                    # Environment unit tests
├── config.py                 # All hyperparameters and experimental constants
└── run_experiment.py         # Entry point

Quick start

pip install -r requirements.txt

# 1. Run the full simulation suite (6 conditions × 1000 agents) — regenerates results/simulation_data.csv
python run_experiment.py --mode simulate

# 2. Analyze (stay-probability regression, model fit, factorial ANOVA)
python run_experiment.py --mode analyze

# 3. Regenerate all figures
python run_experiment.py --mode plot

results/simulation_data.csv (~13 MB) is a regenerable artifact and is git-ignored; step 1 recreates it. The summary outputs (figures, anova_results.txt, w_sweep.csv) are committed so the results are visible without running anything.

Experimental design

The two-stage investment task. Adapted from Kool, Cushman & Gershman's (2016) novel two-step task with an investment framing. Deterministic first-stage transitions and alternating market states are what create a genuine accuracy advantage for model-based planning over model-free caching — the original Daw et al. (2011) 70/30 task does not, so it can't be used to test whether framing modulates arbitration. Stage-2 rewards drift as a bounded Gaussian random walk.

2×3 factorial. Capital framing (scarce / not scarce) × reliability benefit of model-based control (+ / = / −), the latter set by how correlated and volatile the outcome rewards are. In the human arm, framing is manipulated by instructions; in simulation, framing is operationalized as a shift in w, letting us establish the reward-optimal arbitration weight per condition and validate the analysis pipeline.

Hypotheses (Diak 2021). H1: scarce framing → higher w. H2: scarce × +reliability → interaction amplifying model-based control. H3: framing shifts w even absent a reliability benefit (a genuine framing effect, not just reward-chasing).

Results

The w-sweep recovers the expected reward-optimal arbitration weight in each reliability condition (results/w_sweep.png), the stay-probability analysis reproduces the canonical model-based vs model-free behavioral signatures (results/figures/stay_probabilities.png), and the factorial ANOVA over the simulated control weights cleanly separates the conditions (results/anova_results.txt, results/figures/factorial_results.png).

Honest scope. In these runs framing is imposed as a w-shift by construction, so the simulation confirms that the model and the statistical pipeline recover and can detect the hypothesized effects with adequate power — it is a validation of the design, not evidence about human cognition. Whether framing causally shifts arbitration in people is what the browser experiment in web_task/ is built to test; that human arm is the forward piece of the program.

Citation

Diak, C. J. (2021). Modeling the "Capitalist's Dilemma" Using Multiple Reinforcement Learning Systems. HBSDOC 4882: Micro Topics in Organizational Behavior, Harvard University.

References

  • Christensen, C. M. & van Bever, D. C. M. (2014). The Capitalist's Dilemma. Harvard Business Review.
  • Daw, N. D. et al. (2011). Model-based influences on humans' choices and striatal prediction errors. Neuron.
  • Kool, W., Cushman, F. A. & Gershman, S. J. (2016). When does model-based control pay off? PLOS Comp. Bio.
  • Kool, W., Gershman, S. J. & Cushman, F. A. (2017). Cost-benefit arbitration between multiple RL systems. Psych. Science.
  • Lee, S. W., Shimojo, S. & O'Doherty, J. P. (2014). Neural computations underlying arbitration between model-based and model-free learning. Neuron.
  • Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A. G. (2018). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction (2nd ed.). MIT Press.

License

Code released under the MIT License (see LICENSE). The paper (paper/) is © the author.

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