Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability.

Report it privately: https://github.com/cjohnhanson/mdstore/security/advisories/new

That opens a thread only you and the maintainer can read.

Include what an attacker gains, what they must already control to get it, the affected commit, and steps that reproduce it.

mdstore has one maintainer, so response is best effort. Expect a reply within a week.

A confirmed report gets a fix and an advisory published together. You are credited unless you ask otherwise.

mdstore reads and writes markdown documents under a directory. It resolves a store graph from stores.yml declarations. It fetches from three source types: a local path, a git repository, and an https blob prefix.

A store declaration can come from content the reader does not control, such as a vendored dependency or a remote store. What that declaration can reach is the boundary worth attacking.

In scope:

• A document or a store declaration reaching outside the directory it should be confined to.
• A fetch reaching a host or a path that the declaration did not name.
• Reading untrusted content leading to code execution.
• ~/.config/<tool>/config.yml naming a root where a write lands. Each tool reads its own file, named by ToolName. That file is security config. It resolves the home directory from the passwd database, never from an environment variable, because every environment channel is settable by a repository.

Out of scope:

• A dependency advisory with no exploitable path through this library. Report it to that dependency.
• Denial of service from a malformed local file, where the caller already controls that file.

Documented limits are not vulnerabilities. src/confined.rs carries a # What this does not cover section in its module documentation. Read it before reporting a traversal issue.