Fix USENIX discovery coverage and add QUIC-Attacker findings

cmd/corpus-crawl/main.go

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ const (
 var keywords = []string{
 	"censor", "circumvent", "blocking", "blocklist", "allowlist", "whitelist",
 	"throttl", "shutdown", "deep packet inspection", "protocol obfuscat",
-	"great firewall", "iran", "russia", "china", "chinese", "belarus",
+	"great firewall", "geedge", "iran", "russia", "china", "chinese", "belarus",
 	"kazakh", "myanmar", "turkmen", "saudi", "egypt", "north kore",
 	"pakistan", "turkey", "turkish", "vietnam", "indonesia", "ethiopia",
 	"venezuela", "syria", "uzbek", "tajik", "azerbaijan", "afghanistan",
@@ -359,20 +359,19 @@ func runWith(ctx context.Context, opts runOptions) (res *runResult, err error) {
 	if source == "usenix-sec" || source == "all" {
 		// USENIX Security uses a 2-digit-year URL slug. Each year has
 		// up to 2 cycles (Cycle 1, Cycle 2) plus an aggregated
-		// technical-sessions page. We try both cycles for the current
-		// and previous year — broken cycles 404 and we skip cleanly.
+		// technical-sessions page. Include the final program because later
+		// papers may never appear on a cycle page (and some cycles 404).
 		thisYear := time.Now().Year()
 		for _, y := range []int{thisYear, thisYear - 1} {
 			yy := y % 100
-			for _, cycle := range []string{"cycle1-accepted-papers", "cycle2-accepted-papers"} {
-				url := fmt.Sprintf("https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity%02d/%s", yy, cycle)
+			for _, url := range usenixSecurityURLs(y) {
 				us, err := fetchUSENIXSecurity(ctx, url, y)
 				if err != nil {
-					log.Printf("fetch USENIX Sec %d %s: %v (continuing)", y, cycle, err)
-					recordFetchErr(fmt.Sprintf("usenix-sec-%d-%s", y, cycle), err)
+					log.Printf("fetch USENIX Sec %d %s: %v (continuing)", y, url, err)
+					recordFetchErr(fmt.Sprintf("usenix-sec-%d-%s", y, url), err)
 					continue
 				}
-				log.Printf("fetched %d from USENIX Security '%02d %s", len(us), yy, cycle)
+				log.Printf("fetched %d from USENIX Security '%02d %s", len(us), yy, url)
 				cands = append(cands, us...)
 			}
 		}
@@ -1660,13 +1659,20 @@ func fetchPETSymposiumProceedings(ctx context.Context, venuePrefix, url string,
 // we use this just to find section starts and slice the body manually.
 var usenixHeadingRE = regexp.MustCompile(`(?m)^## \[([^\]]+)\]\(([^)]+)\)`)
 
+func usenixSecurityURLs(year int) []string {
+	base := fmt.Sprintf("https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity%02d/", year%100)
+	return []string{base + "technical-sessions", base + "cycle1-accepted-papers", base + "cycle2-accepted-papers"}
+}
+
 func fetchUSENIXSecurity(ctx context.Context, url string, year int) ([]candidate, error) {
 	md, err := wickFetch(ctx, url, "markdown")
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	text := string(md)
+	return parseUSENIXSecurity(string(md), url, year)
+}
 
+func parseUSENIXSecurity(text, url string, year int) ([]candidate, error) {
 	// Find all paper section starts.
 	starts := usenixHeadingRE.FindAllStringSubmatchIndex(text, -1)
 	if len(starts) == 0 {

cmd/corpus-crawl/main_test.go

@@ -180,3 +180,50 @@ func TestSanitizeDropsNonTaxonomyTags(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("valid defense was dropped: %v", got.DefensesDiscussed)
 	}
 }
+
+func TestUSENIXFinalProgramCoverage(t *testing.T) {
+	const base = "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/"
+	urls := usenixSecurityURLs(2026)
+	found := false
+	for _, url := range urls {
+		if url == base+"technical-sessions" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Fatal("missing final program: cycle 2 can be unavailable")
+	}
+	const program = `## [Breaking the Boundaries: Analyzing QUIC Frame-Packet Interactions With QUIC-Attacker](/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/erinola)
+
+Nurullah Erinola, Marcel Maehren, Marcus Brinkmann, and Jörg Schwenk, *Ruhr University Bochum*
+
+We develop probes to explore how different QUIC server implementations handle the coalescence and fragmentation of payloads, covering both valid and invalid combinations of datagrams, packets, and frames.
+
+## [Technical Analysis of the Geedge Networks Firewall Source Code Leak](/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/ablove)
+
+Anna Ablove, *University of Michigan;* Johnnie Walker, *GFW Report*
+
+In this paper, we analyze the source code from this leak, focusing on Geedge Networks' flagship product, the Tiangou Secure Gateway (TSG) firewall.
+`
+	papers, err := parseUSENIXSecurity(program, base+"technical-sessions", 2026)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(papers) != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("parsed %d papers, want 2", len(papers))
+	}
+	for i, slug := range []string{"erinola", "ablove"} {
+		p := papers[i]
+		if p.URL != base+"presentation/"+slug || p.Year != 2026 || len(p.Authors) == 0 || p.Abstract == "" {
+			t.Errorf("incomplete record: %+v", p)
+		}
+		if !matchesKeywordsInText(p.Title) {
+			t.Errorf("title gate drops %q", p.Title)
+		}
+	}
+	existing := &existingCorpus{byID: map[string]bool{}, byTitle: map[string]bool{}, byURL: map[string]bool{}, byArxiv: map[string]bool{}}
+	existing.remember(papers[0])
+	if !existing.contains(papers[0]) {
+		t.Fatal("same paper on a cycle page must deduplicate")
+	}
+}

corpus/findings/2026-erinola-quic-attacker__coalesced-initial-compatibility.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+paper: 2026-erinola-quic-attacker
+kind: evaluation
+summary: In the tested versions, seven of 15 QUIC server libraries fail to process a ClientHello
+  split across two Initial packets coalesced into one UDP datagram. All seven correctly process the
+  corresponding case with the packets in separate datagrams, locating the compatibility difference
+  at datagram composition rather than fragmentation alone.
+techniques:
+- packet-injection
+- http3-quic-block
+censors:
+- generic
+defense_implications:
+- Test generated QUIC fragmentation candidates across multiple endpoint implementations and datagram
+  compositions before field evaluation. Endpoint rejection must be distinguished from censor blocking.
+section: §7.1, Table 3 (P2 and P3)
+extracted_by: codex

corpus/findings/2026-erinola-quic-attacker__composition-test-catalog.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+paper: 2026-erinola-quic-attacker
+kind: evaluation
+summary: QUIC-Attacker exposes control over packets, frames, streams, and cryptographic state for
+  systematic tests of conforming and malformed QUIC flows. The study tests 15 server libraries and
+  reports eight denial-of-service vulnerabilities; its catalogs restrict fragmentation to at most
+  two frames per data stream and do not exhaust all compositions.
+techniques:
+- packet-injection
+- http3-quic-block
+censors:
+- generic
+defense_implications:
+- Use the published catalogs as a starting point for automated compatibility and security evaluation,
+  then expand combinations and client coverage. Passing the catalog is not proof of censorship resistance
+  or complete protocol correctness.
+section: §5–§8, Tables 2–5
+extracted_by: codex

corpus/findings/2026-erinola-quic-attacker__frame-placement-security.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+paper: 2026-erinola-quic-attacker
+kind: evaluation
+summary: The evaluated XQUIC and Kwik versions accept forbidden frame-packet combinations. XQUIC
+  can buffer application STREAM frames from Initial or Handshake packets and process them after the
+  handshake; the authors demonstrate application-data injection and stream-control truncation effects.
+  The paper notes that Kwik developers independently implemented frame-placement validation.
+techniques:
+- packet-injection
+- http3-quic-block
+censors:
+- generic
+defense_implications:
+- Reject protocol candidates that weaken frame-placement validation or accept application data at
+  inappropriate encryption levels. Reproduce the tests against the exact library version selected
+  for deployment.
+section: §7.2.1–§7.2.2, Table 4
+extracted_by: codex

corpus/papers/2026-erinola-quic-attacker.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+id: 2026-erinola-quic-attacker
+title: 'Breaking the Boundaries: Analyzing QUIC Frame-Packet Interactions With QUIC-Attacker'
+authors:
+- Nurullah Erinola
+- Marcel Maehren
+- Marcus Brinkmann
+- Jörg Schwenk
+venue: USENIX Security
+year: 2026
+url: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/erinola
+abstract: The authors introduce QUIC-Attacker and evaluate fragmentation, coalescence, frame placement,
+  and stream-state interactions across 15 QUIC server libraries. Their controlled experiments uncover
+  interoperability differences, eight denial-of-service vulnerabilities, and injection vulnerabilities
+  in Kwik and XQUIC. The framework supports fine-grained construction of both conforming and malformed
+  QUIC traffic.
+censors:
+- generic
+techniques:
+- packet-injection
+- http3-quic-block
+core: false
+notes: 'Protocol-generation pipeline relevance: use the test catalogs and QUIC-Docker-Library to
+  evaluate endpoint compatibility and security when generating QUIC fragmentation or coalescence
+  strategies. This is an application of the research, not a censorship-evasion result reported by
+  the authors. The paper evaluates specific library versions in a controlled lab; do not assume current
+  releases remain vulnerable. Its limited frame combinations are not exhaustive. QUIC-Attacker is
+  implemented in TLS-Attacker: https://github.com/tls-attacker/TLS-Attacker ; deployment artifact:
+  https://github.com/tls-attacker/QUIC-Docker-Library .'
+visibility: public
+date_added: '2026-09-07'
+added_by: codex
+sources:
+- manual:2026-conference-coverage-audit
+- url:https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/technical-sessions
+- url:https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity26-erinola.pdf