[121-service] Bump sanitize-html from 2.17.5 to 2.17.6 in /services/121-service

[dependabot]

Bumps sanitize-html from 2.17.5 to 2.17.6.

Changelog

Sourced from sanitize-html's changelog.

2.17.6 (2026-07-10)

Fixes

• Allow transformTags to emit text when textFilter is set, even if the tag is initially empty. This is consistent with the documentation. Thanks to spokodev for the fix.

Security

• Fixed an XSS/allowlist bypass in which the contents of a raw-text element (textarea or xmp) nested inside an svg or math root were re-emitted without HTML-escaping. sanitize-html treated that content as inert raw text because htmlparser2 10.x classified raw-text elements by tag name and ignored the namespace, but a real HTML5 parser treats textarea/xmp as ordinary foreign elements inside SVG/MathML and re-parses their contents as live markup. As a result, markup and event-handler attributes that the allowlist never permitted (for example <svg><textarea><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>) could survive sanitization and execute in the browser. This is now fixed on two fronts: htmlparser2 was upgraded to 12.x, which is namespace-aware and parses textarea/xmp inside SVG/MathML as ordinary elements, so their non-allowlisted children (such as the injected img) are dropped by the allowlist instead of being preserved as raw text; and any raw-text content sanitize-html still emits for these tags (at HTML integration points such as foreignObject/mtext, or outside foreign content) is always HTML-escaped. The default configuration is not affected; the precondition is an allowedTags that includes svg or math together with textarea or xmp. Thanks to khoadb175 for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.
• Fixed a mutation-XSS / allowedTags bypass affecting configurations that allow the textarea or xmp raw-text tags. htmlparser2 10.x did not recognize an end tag with a trailing solidus (e.g. </textarea/>) as closing the element, so it kept the following markup as raw text, but a spec-compliant browser treats </textarea/> as a valid close and parses that markup as a live element. Because raw-text content was re-emitted without escaping, a payload such as <textarea></textarea/><img src=x onerror=...> could smuggle non-allowlisted, executable markup through the sanitizer. The default configuration was not affected. This is now defended at two layers: htmlparser2 was upgraded to 12.x, whose tokenizer closes these end tags correctly, and the raw text sanitize-html emits for these tags is always escaped so no < can reopen a tag when the output is re-parsed (textarea, an RCDATA element whose entities htmlparser2 decodes, is escaped like normal text, while xmp, a raw-text element, has only its angle brackets escaped to avoid double-encoding already-encoded entities). Because htmlparser2 is ESM-only from version 11 onward, sanitize-html now requires Node.js >=22.12.0 (the first 22.x release in which require() of an ES module is available unflagged). Thanks to bibu123456 for reporting the vulnerability and Kayiz-PT for coordinating the disclosure (GHSA-jxwj-j7wr-gfrw).

Commits

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[elwinschmitz]

@dependabot rebase

[dependabot]

Looks like this PR has been edited by someone other than Dependabot. That means Dependabot can't rebase it - sorry!

If you're happy for Dependabot to recreate it from scratch, overwriting any edits, you can request @dependabot recreate.

[elwinschmitz]

@dependabot recreate