chore(deps): bump actions/setup-node from 6 to 7

[dependabot]

Bumps actions/setup-node from 6 to 7.

Release notes

Sourced from actions/setup-node's releases.

v7.0.0

What's Changed

Enhancements:

• Add cache-primary-key and cache-matched-key as outputs by @​gowridurgad in actions/setup-node#1577
• Migrate to ESM and upgrade dependencies by @​gowridurgad in actions/setup-node#1574

Bug fixes:

• Remove dummy NODE_AUTH_TOKEN export by @​gowridurgad in actions/setup-node#1558
• Only use mirrorToken in getManifest if it's provided by @​deiga in actions/setup-node#1548

Documentation updates:

• Add documentation for publishing to npm with Trusted Publisher (OIDC) by @​chiranjib-swain in actions/setup-node#1536
• docs: Update restore-only cache documentation by @​priya-kinthali in actions/setup-node#1550
• docs: Update caching recommendations to mitigate cache poisoning risks by @​chiranjib-swain in actions/setup-node#1567

Dependency update:

• Upgrade @​actions/cache to 5.1.0, log cache write denied by @​jasongin in actions/setup-node#1569

New Contributors

• @​chiranjib-swain made their first contribution in actions/setup-node#1536
• @​deiga made their first contribution in actions/setup-node#1548
• @​jasongin made their first contribution in actions/setup-node#1569

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6...v7.0.0

v6.5.0

What's Changed

• Update @​actions/cache to 5.1.0 and add security overrides for undici and fast-xml-parser by @​HarithaVattikuti in actions/setup-node#1579

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6.4.0...v6.5.0

v6.4.0

What's Changed

Dependency updates:

• Upgrade @​actions dependencies by @​Copilot in actions/setup-node#1525
• Update Node.js versions in versions.yml and bump package to v6.4.0 by @​priya-kinthali in actions/setup-node#1533

New Contributors

• @​Copilot made their first contribution in actions/setup-node#1525

Full Changelog: actions/setup-node@v6...v6.4.0

v6.3.0

What's Changed

Enhancements:

• Support parsing devEngines field by @​susnux in actions/setup-node#1283

... (truncated)

Commits

• 8207627 Migrate to ESM and upgrade dependencies (#1574)
• 04be95c Add cache-primary-key and cache-matched-key as outputs (#1577)
• 7c2c68d docs: Update caching recommendations to mitigate cache poisoning risks (#1567)
• 6a61c03 Merge pull request #1569 from jasongin/update-actions-cache-5.1.0
• 30eb73b Resolve high-severity audit issues
• 4e1a87a Update dist
• 360237f Strict equality
• 4f8aac5 Bump @​actions/cache to 5.1.0, log cache write denied
• f4a67bb Only use mirrorToken in getManifest if it's provided (#1548)
• 0355742 Remove dummy NODE_AUTH_TOKEN export (#1558)
• Additional commits viewable in compare view

[dependabot]

Labels

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Please fix the above issues or remove invalid values from dependabot.yml.

[github-actions]

g0 security scan

Score 55/100 (F)

Severity	Count
Critical	6
High	49
Medium	10
Low	1

Findings

• CRITICAL /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:226 — Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible. Address AA-SC-130: Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible
• CRITICAL analyzers/pipeline-taint.ts:4 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
• CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: fetch-then-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: db-code-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: write-then-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: shell-network. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/mcp.ts:102 — Shell execution tool detected. Remove shell execution tool or wrap it with strict input validation and allowlisting.
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:52 — Shell execution tool detected. Remove shell execution tool or wrap it with strict input validation and allowlisting.
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:54 — Database tool without input validation. Use parameterized queries and validate all input before database operations.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:440 — child_process.exec() usage detected. Use child_process.execFile() or child_process.spawn() instead of exec/execSync to avoid shell injection.

57 more findings

• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:53 — Code execution tool without sandboxing. Run code execution in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, subprocess with restrictions).
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:53 — Code execution tool without sandbox. Run code execution tools in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, etc.).
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:265 — Code execution tool without sandboxing. Run code execution in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, subprocess with restrictions).
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:265 — Code execution tool without sandbox. Run code execution tools in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, etc.).
• HIGH testing/payloads/openclaw-attacks.ts:66 — OpenAI API key detected in source code. Move secrets to environment variables or a secret manager. Never commit secrets to source code.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:16 — eval() with dynamic input. Remove eval() usage. Use safe alternatives like JSON.parse() or ast.literal_eval().
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:163 — new Function() constructor used. Remove new Function() usage. Use safe alternatives.
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:177 — LLM output executed as code. Never pass LLM output to exec() or eval(). Use a sandboxed code interpreter or safe parsing instead.
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/mcp.ts:145 — LLM output executed as code. Never pass LLM output to exec() or eval(). Use a sandboxed code interpreter or safe parsing instead.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:804 — Unsandboxed Docker socket access. Avoid mounting the Docker socket directly. Use a restricted Docker API proxy or rootless Docker.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:167 — Function() constructor with dynamic input. Avoid new Function() with dynamic input. Use safe alternatives or a sandboxed environment.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:980 — Template engine SSTI risk. Never pass user input directly into template strings. Use render_template() with named templates instead.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:1840 — ptrace/debugging syscall detected. Block ptrace and debugging syscalls via seccomp profiles. Set Yama ptrace_scope to restricted.
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/mdm-detect.ts:85 — LLM-generated code execution. Sandbox code execution or use allowlisted operations only
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/agentic-browser-scanner.ts:61 — Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec. Address AA-CE-063: Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:10 — Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec. Address AA-CE-063: Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/mdm-detect.ts:56 — Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec. Address AA-CE-063: Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/openclaw-config-hardener.ts:105 — Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec. Address AA-CE-063: Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/openclaw-config-hardener.ts:105 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/process-detector.ts:75 — Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec. Address AA-CE-063: Direct code/command execution — exec, os.system, child_process, Runtime.exec
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/scoring.ts:222 — All environment variables dumped — credential exposure. Address AA-DL-109: All environment variables dumped — credential exposure
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:41 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:63 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:80 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:97 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:114 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:131 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:146 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:161 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:179 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/auditd-rules.ts:55 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:63 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:70 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:570 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:637 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:210 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:369 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:513 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:544 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:545 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:666 — System prompt has no scope boundaries. Add explicit role definition, allowed actions, and behavioral boundaries to the system prompt.
• HIGH analyzers/rules/tool-safety.ts:1074 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
• HIGH endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:372 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
• HIGH .:0 — Cross-tool risk: read-then-exfil. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• HIGH .:0 — Cross-tool risk: db-exfil. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
• MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/mdm-detect.ts:128 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
• MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:734 — Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk. Address AA-TS-128: Tool has Docker API access — container escape risk
• MEDIUM analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:55 — Filesystem tool without path validation. Validate and sanitize file paths. Use allowlists for permitted directories.
• MEDIUM analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:399 — os.system call detected. Validate and sanitize all inputs before passing to subprocess.
• MEDIUM enforcement/edm.ts:23 — API key in URL query parameter. Pass API keys in HTTP headers (Authorization, X-API-Key) instead of URL query parameters.
• MEDIUM testing/judge/llm-prompts.ts:69 — API key in URL query parameter. Pass API keys in HTTP headers (Authorization, X-API-Key) instead of URL query parameters.
• MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/sensitive-paths.ts:60 — Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk. Address AA-CE-052: Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk
• MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/scoring.ts:222 — Agent accesses environment variables. Address AA-RA-043: Agent accesses environment variables
• MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/agent-config-scanner.ts:257 — Tool has email sending capability — phishing and data exfiltration risk. Address AA-TS-105: Tool has email sending capability — phishing and data exfiltration risk
• MEDIUM analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:56 — Tool has unrestricted network access. Address AA-TS-062: Tool has unrestricted network access
• LOW analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:204 — Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior. Address AA-GI-073: Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior
• INFO analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:204 — Agent has no error handler configured. Address AA-CF-064: Agent has no error handler configured

Gate: PASSED ✅

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