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chore(deps): bump web-tree-sitter from 0.25.10 to 0.26.11 - #195

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chore(deps): bump web-tree-sitter from 0.25.10 to 0.26.11#195
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@dependabot dependabot Bot commented on behalf of github Jul 27, 2026

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Bumps web-tree-sitter from 0.25.10 to 0.26.11.

Release notes

Sourced from web-tree-sitter's releases.

v0.26.11

What's Changed

Full Changelog: tree-sitter/tree-sitter@v0.26.10...v0.26.11

v0.26.10

What's Changed

Full Changelog: tree-sitter/tree-sitter@v0.26.9...v0.26.10

v0.26.9

What's Changed

... (truncated)

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Maintainer changes

This version was pushed to npm by GitHub Actions, a new releaser for web-tree-sitter since your current version.


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@dependabot
chore(deps): bump web-tree-sitter from 0.25.10 to 0.26.11
82437be 
Bumps [web-tree-sitter](https://github.com/tree-sitter/tree-sitter/tree/HEAD/lib/binding_web) from 0.25.10 to 0.26.11.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/tree-sitter/tree-sitter/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/tree-sitter/tree-sitter/commits/v0.26.11/lib/binding_web)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: web-tree-sitter
  dependency-version: 0.26.11
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
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g0 security scan

Score 55/100 (F)

Severity Count
Critical 7
High 32
Medium 13
Low 3

Findings

  • CRITICAL /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/auditd-rules.ts:28 — Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible. Address AA-SC-130: Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible
  • CRITICAL /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:226 — Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible. Address AA-SC-130: Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible
  • CRITICAL analyzers/pipeline-taint.ts:4 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
  • CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: fetch-then-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: db-code-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: write-then-exec. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • CRITICAL .:0 — Cross-tool risk: shell-network. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:52 — Shell execution tool detected. Remove shell execution tool or wrap it with strict input validation and allowlisting.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/mcp.ts:102 — Shell execution tool detected. Remove shell execution tool or wrap it with strict input validation and allowlisting.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:54 — Database tool without input validation. Use parameterized queries and validate all input before database operations.
48 more findings
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:440 — child_process.exec() usage detected. Use child_process.execFile() or child_process.spawn() instead of exec/execSync to avoid shell injection.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:53 — Code execution tool without sandboxing. Run code execution in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, subprocess with restrictions).
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:53 — Code execution tool without sandbox. Run code execution tools in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, etc.).
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:265 — Code execution tool without sandboxing. Run code execution in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, subprocess with restrictions).
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:265 — Code execution tool without sandbox. Run code execution tools in a sandboxed environment (Docker, E2B, etc.).
  • HIGH testing/payloads/openclaw-attacks.ts:66 — OpenAI API key detected in source code. Move secrets to environment variables or a secret manager. Never commit secrets to source code.
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:16 — eval() with dynamic input. Remove eval() usage. Use safe alternatives like JSON.parse() or ast.literal_eval().
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:163 — new Function() constructor used. Remove new Function() usage. Use safe alternatives.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/autogen.ts:75 — LLM output executed as code. Never pass LLM output to exec() or eval(). Use a sandboxed code interpreter or safe parsing instead.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:177 — LLM output executed as code. Never pass LLM output to exec() or eval(). Use a sandboxed code interpreter or safe parsing instead.
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/mcp.ts:145 — LLM output executed as code. Never pass LLM output to exec() or eval(). Use a sandboxed code interpreter or safe parsing instead.
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:804 — Unsandboxed Docker socket access. Avoid mounting the Docker socket directly. Use a restricted Docker API proxy or rootless Docker.
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:167 — Function() constructor with dynamic input. Avoid new Function() with dynamic input. Use safe alternatives or a sandboxed environment.
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:980 — Template engine SSTI risk. Never pass user input directly into template strings. Use render_template() with named templates instead.
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:1840 — ptrace/debugging syscall detected. Block ptrace and debugging syscalls via seccomp profiles. Set Yama ptrace_scope to restricted.
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/mdm-detect.ts:85 — LLM-generated code execution. Sandbox code execution or use allowlisted operations only
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/agentic-browser-scanner.ts:446 — Agent accesses file system paths outside sandbox boundaries. Address AA-RA-040: Agent accesses file system paths outside sandbox boundaries
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/openclaw-config-hardener.ts:60 — Agent accesses file system paths outside sandbox boundaries. Address AA-RA-040: Agent accesses file system paths outside sandbox boundaries
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/egress-monitor.ts:415 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/host-hardening.ts:41 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/openclaw-config-hardener.ts:105 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:383 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/falco-rules.ts:227 — Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible. Address AA-SC-130: Docker socket mounted into container — full container escape possible
  • HIGH analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:666 — System prompt has no scope boundaries. Add explicit role definition, allowed actions, and behavioral boundaries to the system prompt.
  • HIGH /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:381 — Container runs as root — container escape with root access risk. Address AA-SC-100: Container runs as root — container escape with root access risk
  • HIGH analyzers/rules/tool-safety.ts:1074 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
  • HIGH endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:372 — Pipeline taint: shell exfiltration chain. Remove or sandbox shell commands that pipe sensitive data to network endpoints. Use structured APIs instead of shell pipes.
  • HIGH .:0 — Cross-tool risk: read-then-exfil. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • HIGH .:0 — Cross-tool risk: db-exfil. Limit tool capabilities for agent "AgentExecutor". Apply least-privilege: separate data-access tools from network/execution tools.
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/scanner.ts:168 — Agent dynamically registers tools without validation. Address AA-RA-019: Agent dynamically registers tools without validation
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/mdm-detect.ts:128 — Agent accesses kernel interfaces. Address AA-RA-047: Agent accesses kernel interfaces
  • MEDIUM analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:55 — Filesystem tool without path validation. Validate and sanitize file paths. Use allowlists for permitted directories.
  • MEDIUM analyzers/rules/code-execution.ts:399 — os.system call detected. Validate and sanitize all inputs before passing to subprocess.
  • MEDIUM enforcement/edm.ts:23 — API key in URL query parameter. Pass API keys in HTTP headers (Authorization, X-API-Key) instead of URL query parameters.
  • MEDIUM testing/judge/llm-prompts.ts:69 — API key in URL query parameter. Pass API keys in HTTP headers (Authorization, X-API-Key) instead of URL query parameters.
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/forensics-scanner.ts:97 — Unparameterized SQL query. Use parameterized queries (?, $1, :param) instead of string concatenation.
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/agent-config-scanner.ts:384 — Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk. Address AA-CE-052: Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/sensitive-paths.ts:60 — Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk. Address AA-CE-052: Untrusted input flows to file path operation — path traversal risk
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/browser-scanner.ts:406 — Weak or deprecated cipher suite used for agent communication. Address AA-IC-139: Weak or deprecated cipher suite used for agent communication
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/tetragon-rules.ts:387 — Weak or deprecated cipher suite used for agent communication. Address AA-IC-139: Weak or deprecated cipher suite used for agent communication
  • MEDIUM /home/runner/work/g0/g0/src/endpoint/agent-config-scanner.ts:257 — Tool has email sending capability — phishing and data exfiltration risk. Address AA-TS-105: Tool has email sending capability — phishing and data exfiltration risk
  • MEDIUM analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:56 — Tool has unrestricted network access. Address AA-TS-062: Tool has unrestricted network access
  • LOW analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:204 — Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior. Address AA-GI-073: Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior
  • LOW analyzers/parsers/autogen.ts:329 — Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior. Address AA-GI-073: Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior
  • LOW analyzers/parsers/openai.ts:9 — Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior. Address AA-GI-073: Agent has no system prompt — vulnerable to unbounded behavior
  • INFO analyzers/parsers/langchain.ts:204 — Agent has no error handler configured. Address AA-CF-064: Agent has no error handler configured
  • INFO analyzers/parsers/autogen.ts:329 — Agent has no error handler configured. Address AA-CF-064: Agent has no error handler configured
  • INFO analyzers/parsers/openai.ts:9 — Agent has no error handler configured. Address AA-CF-064: Agent has no error handler configured

Gate: PASSED ✅

— See findings across every repo in your org → https://guard0.ai/signup?utm_source=github&utm_medium=pr_comment&utm_campaign=g0_action

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