Handle Cronet by re-enabling pinning bypass for local trust anchors

[az-xx]

What this adds

Cronet — Chromium's network stack, used by many Google apps, gRPC and various other SDKs — runs TLS itself in native code and ignores the JVM proxy, OkHttp and TrustManager layers entirely, so none of the existing hooks in android-certificate-unpinning.js affect it.

Cronet does trust locally-installed CAs by default, but only while public-key-pinning bypass for local trust anchors is left enabled. An app can turn that off with a single builder call:

new CronetEngine.Builder(context)
    .enablePublicKeyPinningBypassForLocalTrustAnchors(false)
    // ...

…after which even a user/admin-installed CA (like the one this toolkit injects) can no longer intercept its connections.

The fix

Hook org.chromium.net.CronetEngine$Builder.enablePublicKeyPinningBypassForLocalTrustAnchors to always pass true, regardless of what the app requested, and return the builder so chaining keeps working.

This follows the same philosophy as the surrounding hooks — it disables only the extra restriction (pinning layered on top of a locally-trusted CA), so the injected CA is accepted while pinning stays fully intact for connections that chain to a real, non-local trust anchor. addPublicKeyPins is deliberately left untouched for that reason.

Notes

• The class is skipped automatically on apps that don't bundle Cronet, exactly like every other entry in PINNING_FIXES.
• The hooked signature is part of the public org.chromium.net API (CronetEngine.Builder).

[CLAassistant]

All committers have signed the CLA.

[pimterry]

That's perfect, thanks @az-xx! Merged.